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    n 1949, the drafters of the Geneva Conventions decided to place the ob-
ligation for States parties to “respect and ensure respect” for the Conven-
tions upfront. The obligation was codified as the very first article of the four 
Conventions, which is why it is generally referred to as “common Article 1.”1  
How the obligation to “respect and ensure respect” should be inter-
preted has been the subject of debate for many years. This debate has fo-
cused in particular on the meaning to be attributed to the words “ensure 
respect.” Some see these words as playing an important role in ensuring 
compliance with international humanitarian law (IHL). In particular, they ar-
gue that the obligation to ensure respect has an external element or dimen-
sion which obliges States parties to the Geneva Conventions to take positive 
steps to ensure compliance with those conventions by other States and even 
organized armed groups.2 Others suggest that the obligation to ensure re-
spect is a “soap bubble” devoid of any autonomous legal meaning.3 
The debate has been reinvigorated by the publication of the updated In-
ternational Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) commentaries to Geneva 
Conventions I, II, and III. These commentaries attribute an expansive mean-
ing to common Article 1.4 A number of commentators have taken issue with 
 
1. Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
the Armed Forces in the Field art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [herein-
after Geneva Convention I]; Convention (II) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the 
Wounded, Sick, and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention (III) Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of 
War art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135; Convention (IV) Relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War art. 1, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 
U.N.T.S. 287. 
2. See, e.g., Robin Geiss, The Obligation to Respect and Ensure Respect for the Conventions, in 
THE 1949 GENEVA CONVENTIONS: A COMMENTARY 109 (Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta 
& Marco Sassòli eds., 2016); Oona A. Hathaway et al., Ensuring Responsibility: Common Article 
1 and State Responsibility for Non-State Actors, 96 TEXAS LAW REVIEW 539, 569–77 (2017).   
3. Carlo Focarelli, Common Article 1 of the 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Soap Bubble?, 21 
EUROPEAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 125, 171 (2010). 
4. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE THIRD 
GENEVA CONVENTION: CONVENTION (III) RELATIVE TO THE TREATMENT OF PRISONERS 
OF WAR ¶¶ 153–222 (2021) [hereinafter ICRC, 2021 UPDATED COMMENTARY TO GENEVA 
CONVENTION III]; INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, COMMENTARY ON 
THE SECOND GENEVA CONVENTION: CONVENTION (II) FOR THE AMELIORATION OF 
THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED, SICK, AND SHIPWRECKED MEMBERS OF ARMED 














this reading and argue for a much less far-reaching interpretation of the ar-
ticle. They suggest that in recent years the international courts, the ICRC, 
and academic commentators have “reimagined” common Article 1.5  
The answer to the question of whether Article 1 contains an external 
element is important because if this is the case the potential responsibility of 
States parties under the Geneva Conventions is greater than if it is not. Such 
an obligation would go beyond the bases for responsibility under the law of 
State responsibility, in particular Article 16 of the International Law Com-
mission’s (ILC) Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally 
Wrongful Acts.6 Just how much further depends on the scope of the obliga-
tion: does it only require States not to do something, or does it also impose 
positive obligations, and does it apply only in international armed conflicts 
(IACs) or also in non-international armed conflicts (NIACs)? This article will 
not address these questions. Instead,  it focuses on whether an interpretation 
of common Article 1 leads to the conclusion that it contains an external ele-
ment in the first place. If the answer to that question is in the affirmative, it 
is, of course, important to determine the scope of such an element.  
It is interesting to note that the travaux préparatoires of the Geneva Con-
ventions, as well as State practice, play an important part in the argumenta-
tion used by both sides of the debate. Yet, those sides draw very different 
conclusions from the same information. This suggests that it is worthwhile 
to take a fresh look at the drafting history of common Article 1 and State 
practice regarding the provision. That is the objective of this article, which 
will place those two elements in the broader framework of treaty interpreta-
tion. Common Article 1 is a treaty provision and establishing its meaning is 
thus a matter of treaty interpretation. Therefore, the article will focus on 
applying the rules of treaty interpretation to common Article 1 to determine 
whether it has an external element. 
 
COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION II]; INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED 
CROSS, COMMENTARY ON THE FIRST GENEVA CONVENTION: CONVENTION (I) FOR THE 
AMELIORATION OF THE CONDITION OF THE WOUNDED AND SICK IN THE ARMED 
FORCES IN THE FIELD ¶¶ 125–26, 153–79 (2016) [hereinafter ICRC, 2016 UPDATED COM-
MENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I].   
5. See Michael N. Schmitt & Sean Watts, Common Article 1 and the Duty to “Ensure Respect,” 
96 INTERNATIONAL LAW STUDIES 674, 679 (2020); see also Verity Robson, The Common Ap-
proach to Article 1: The Scope of Each State’s Obligation to Ensure Respect for the Geneva Conventions, 
25 JOURNAL OF CONFLICT AND SECURITY LAW 101 (2020).   
6. G.A. Res. 56/83, annex, art. 16, Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful 











The article proceeds from two premises. First, that determining the 
meaning of common Article 1 is a matter of treaty interpretation. This means 
that the rules on treaty interpretation are to be applied. Those rules have 
been codified in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT).7 
They are generally considered to reflect customary international law, includ-
ing by the International Court of Justice (ICJ).8 These rules are not always 
applied equally consistently in writings on common Article 1, however. In 
particular, a narrow focus on the travaux préparatoires of a treaty provision 
does not fully take into account all the elements that play a role in the inter-
pretation of a treaty provision. The second premise is that the writing on 
common Article 1 has not to date considered all available State practice. It 
will be shown that there is additional practice available from a number of 
States. 
Proceeding from these premises, the article attempts to establish the 
meaning of common Article 1. It focuses, in particular, on the obligation to 
ensure respect, specifically on whether that obligation contains an external 
element. The article will not discuss whether the obligation to ensure respect 
constitutes an obligation under customary international law. This is a conse-
quence of the article’s focus on the interpretation of the treaty provision in 
the Geneva Conventions. As stated above, it will also not enter into the de-
bate on the precise content of an external element, if there is one. Views on 
the content that others have put forward range from an obligation not to 
encourage parties to an armed conflict to commit violations of IHL to a duty 
to take far-reaching measures to prevent and sanction such violations.9 Fi-
nally, the article will not address whether the obligation to ensure respect 
only applies in IACs or also applies in NIACs. 
The article is structured as follows. Part II will introduce the obligation 
to ensure respect, followed by a discussion of the relevant rules of treaty 
interpretation in Part III. In Part IV, the general rule of treaty interpretation 
 
7. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 26, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 
[hereinafter Vienna Convention].   
8. See, e.g., Jadhav (India v. Pak.), Judgment, 2019 I.C.J. Rep. 418, ¶ 71 (July 17); Avena 
and Other Mexican Nationals (Mex. v. U.S.), Judgment, 2004 I.C.J. Rep. 12, ¶ 83 (Mar. 31); 
Immunities and Criminal Proceedings (Eq. Guinea v. Fr.), Judgment, ¶ 61 (Dec. 11, 2020), 
https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/163/163-20201211-JUD-01-00-EN.pdf.  
9. The ICJ in the Nicaragua case held that common Article 1 prohibited the United 
States from encouraging violations of IHL by the Contras. See Military and Paramilitary 
Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 114 
(June 27). For further reaching views on what is required under common Article 1, see, e.g., 











will be applied to common Article 1. Part V will consider supplementary 
means of interpretation, including the travaux préparatoires of the provision. 
The article concludes with several final considerations. 
 
II. INTRODUCTION OF THE OBLIGATION TO “ENSURE RESPECT” 
 
The obligation to ensure respect was not part of an IHL treaty before 1949. 
In that year, it was inserted in common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions. 
The rest of the Article had previously been included in the 1929 Geneva 
Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War10 and the Geneva 
Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick 
in Armies in the Field of the same year.11 Articles 82 and 25, respectively, of 
these two Conventions, provide, inter alia, that “The provisions of the pre-
sent Convention shall be respected by the High Contracting Parties in all 
circumstances.”  
The words “ensure respect” originated from a draft submitted by the 
ICRC in May 1948 to the XVIIth International Conference of the Red Cross 
and Red Crescent.12 They were included in the drafts discussed at the diplo-
matic conference that drafted the 1949 Conventions. That conference 
adopted what is now common Article 1 with minor changes and little dis-
cussion.13 
 
10. Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 
2021, T.S. No. 846, 118 L.N.T.S. 343 [hereinafter 1929 Prisoner of War Convention].  
11. Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in 
Armies in the Field, July 27, 1929, 47 Stat. 2074, T.S. No. 847, 118 L.N.T.S. 303 [hereinafter 
1929 Convention for the Wounded and Sick in the Field]. 
12. INTERNATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE RED CROSS, DRAFT REVISED OR NEW CON-
VENTIONS FOR THE PROTECTION OF WAR VICTIMS 4, 34, 51, 222 (1948), https:// 
www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/RC_Draft-revised.pdf. 
13. Knut Dörmann & Jose Serralvo, Common Article 1 to the Geneva Conventions and the 
Obligation to Prevent International Humanitarian Law Violations, 96 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF 











In 1977, the obligation to “respect and ensure respect” was also inserted 
in Additional Protocol I to the Geneva Conventions,14 but not in Additional 
Protocol II.15 In 2005, it was included in Additional Protocol III.16 
As little discussion as there was concerning common Article 1 at the 
diplomatic conference that adopted the Geneva Conventions, there has been 
much debate in subsequent years concerning how to interpret the phrase. 
The heart of the debate is whether the “ensure respect” provision obliges 
States to ensure respect by their people as a whole or whether it also contains 
an “external dimension.” “External dimension” or “external element” refers 
to an obligation for States to ensure respect for the Conventions, not only 
internally (i.e., by their nationals), but also by other States, and possibly even 
by organized armed groups involved in extraterritorial NIACs.17 The debate 
was fueled by the ICJ’s reference to common Article 1 in its judgment in the 
Nicaragua case in 1986.18  
The invocation of the provision by the ICJ in its advisory opinion in the 
Wall case in 2004 further stimulated the debate.19 More recently, the provi-
sion has again become the center of attention following the publication of 
updated ICRC commentaries to the Geneva Conventions from 2016 on-
ward. In those, the ICRC takes what has been referred to as an “expansion-
ist” position on how the obligation to ensure respect should be interpreted.20 
The ICRC considers that the obligation includes an external dimension re-
lated to ensuring respect for the Conventions by other States: “Accordingly, 
States, whether neutral, allied or enemy, must do everything reasonably in 
 
14. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts art. 1(1), June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter Additional Protocol I]. 
15. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949, and Relating 
to the Protection of Victims of Non-international Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125 
U.N.T.S. 609 [hereinafter Additional Protocol II]. 
16. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating 
to the Adoption of an Additional Distinctive Emblem art. 1(1), Dec. 8, 2005, 2404 U.N.T.S. 
261 [hereinafter Additional Protocol III]. 
17. See Geiss, supra note 2, at 126. 
18.  Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), Judg-
ment, 1986 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 220 (June 27). 
19. Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian Ter-
ritory, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 136 (July 9).   











their power to ensure respect for the Conventions by others that are Party 
to a conflict.”21  
A few States and commentators have taken issue with this position. They 
have stated that they do not believe that the obligation to ensure respect has 
an external dimension. In particular, the United States has made this clear. 
In remarks by the then-U.S. State Department Legal Adviser Brian Egan 
delivered at the 2016 annual meeting of the American Society of Interna-
tional Law, he stated: 
  
Some have argued that the obligation in Common Article 1 of the Geneva 
Conventions to “ensure respect” for the Conventions legally requires us to 
undertake such steps and more vis-à-vis not only our partners, but all States 
and non-State actors engaged in armed conflict. Although we do not share 
this expansive interpretation of Common Article 1, as a matter of policy, 
we always seek to promote adherence to the law of armed conflict generally 
and encourage other States to do the same.22  
 
III. THE RULES OF TREATY INTERPRETATION 
 
As seen above, there are different views on the correct interpretation of com-
mon Article 1 and, in particular, on the obligation to ensure respect. This 
raises the question of what rules should be applied to interpret this provision. 
The starting point for the answer is that the Geneva Conventions, as well as 
Additional Protocols I and III, are treaties; consequently, they are to be in-
terpreted using the rules of treaty interpretation. These rules have been cod-
ified in the VCLT. It does not matter that the VCLT was adopted twenty 
years after the Geneva Conventions, because the interpretation of those 
Conventions takes place in the present. Article 31 VCLT sets out the general 






21. ICRC, 2017 UPDATED COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION II, supra note 4, 
at 48. 
22. Brian Egan, Legal Adviser, U.S. Department of State, Keynote Address at the 
American Society for International Law: International Law, Legal Diplomacy, and the 
Counter-ISIL Campaign (Apr. 1, 2016), https://www.justsecurity.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2016/04/Egan-ASIL-speech.pdf; audio available at https://www.asil.org/resourc 












General rule of interpretation 
 
1. A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in accordance with the 
ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and 
in the light of its object and purpose. 
 
2. The context for the purpose of the interpretation of a treaty shall 
comprise, in addition to the text, including its preamble and annexes: 
(a) any agreement relating to the treaty which was made between all 
the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty; 
(b) any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connec-
tion with the conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as 
an instrument related to the treaty. 
 
3. There shall be taken into account, together with the context: 
(a) any subsequent agreement between the parties regarding the inter-
pretation of the treaty or the application of its provisions; 
(b) any subsequent practice in the application of the treaty which es-
tablishes the agreement of the parties regarding its interpretation; 
(c) any relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations 
between the parties. 
 
4. A special meaning shall be given to a term if it is established that the 
parties so intended.23 
 
Article 31 does not provide a hierarchy between the various means of 
interpretation that are part of the general rule. It follows from this that the 
various means set forth in Article 31 are of equal value; none are of an infe-
rior character. They are to be considered in one (and the same) process of 
application: they are part of one “single combined operation.”24 Or, as the 
ILC’s special rapporteur on the law of treaties put it: “the process of 
 
23. Vienna Convention, supra note 7, art 31. 
24. MARK VILLIGER, COMMENTARY ON THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF 
TREATIES 435 (2009); see also draft conclusion 2 (5) of the Draft Conclusions on Subsequent 
Agreements and Subsequent Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties adopted 
by the International Law Commission in 2016. Int’l Law Comm’n, Report of the Work of 
its Sixty-Eighth Session, U.N. Doc. A/71/10, at 119, 120 (2016) [hereinafter ILC Draft 











interpretation was essentially a simultaneous one, though logic might dictate 
a certain order of thought.”25 
With respect to Article 31(3), it bears noting that the ILC initiated a study 
in 2008 on the topic of “treaties over time.” In 2012, the topic was changed 
to subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in relation to the inter-
pretation of treaties. In 2016, the ILC adopted a set of draft conclusions on 
this topic on first reading, as well as commentaries on the draft conclusions.26 
The objective of the draft conclusions is to explain the role that subsequent 
agreements and subsequent practice play in the interpretation of treaties. 
They situate subsequent agreements and subsequent practice within the 
framework of the VCLT rules on interpretation by identifying and elucidat-
ing relevant authorities and examples and addressing certain questions that 
may arise when applying those rules.27 In other words, the draft conclusions 
clarify certain aspects of Article 31(3).  
Article 32 VCLT provides for supplementary means of interpretation. 
These may be used to confirm the meaning resulting from the application of 
Article 31 or to determine the meaning when the interpretation, according 
to Article 31, (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure, or (b) leads to a 
result that is manifestly absurd or unreasonable. Article 32 does not provide 
an exhaustive list of supplementary means of interpretation but merely states 
that these include the preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances 
of its conclusion. What supplementary means may be considered along with 
those mentioned in the text has not yet been established conclusively in prac-
tice or doctrine.28 It is commonly agreed that the subsequent practice of 
States not meeting the criteria of Article 31 qualifies as another supplemen-
tary means of interpretation.29 This has been accepted by the ICJ.30 
 
25. [1966] 2 Y.B. Int’l Law Comm’n ¶ 36, at 206, U.N. Doc. A/CN/SER.A/1966/ 
Add.1. 
26. ILC Draft Conclusions, supra note 24. 
27. Id. at 124. 
28. Oliver Dörr & Kirsten Schmalenbach, Article 32: Supplementary Means of Interpretation, 
in THE VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREATIES 617, 626 (Oliver Dörr & Kirsten 
Schmalenbach eds, 2012). 
29. Id. at 627. 
30. Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots./Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 1045, ¶¶ 79–80 











The rules laid down in Articles 31 and 32 have been held by international 
courts and tribunals to reflect customary international law, including by the 
ICJ and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea.31 
As stated above, the means of interpretation set forth in Article 31 are 
intended to be applied in one single, combined operation. As a practical mat-
ter, however, the interpreter of a treaty provision will have to start some-
where and proceed step by step. Only after all the steps have been taken can 
a final conclusion be drawn because all the elements are to be evaluated to-
gether.32 The logical first step is to consider the ordinary meaning of the 
term.33   
This is of particular importance because some commentators, in their 
interpretation of common Article 1, attach great importance to its travaux 
préparatoires. Mainly based on this drafting history, they conclude that the in-
tention of parties that adopted the Article was not to include an external 
dimension.34  
It is true that the objective of treaty interpretation is to give effect to the 
presumed intention of the parties. However, this presumed intention is to 
be established by applying the various means of interpretation recognized in 
Articles 31 and 32. As the ILC states, 
 
The “presumed intention” is thus not a separately identifiable original will, 
and the travaux préparatoires are not the primary basis for determining the 
presumed intention of the parties, but they are only, as article 32 indicates, 
a supplementary means of interpretation. And although interpretation 
must seek to identify the intention of the parties, this must be done by the 
interpreter on the basis of the means of interpretation that are available at 
the time of the act of interpretation and that include subsequent agree-
ments and subsequent practice of parties to the treaty. The interpreter thus 
has to answer the question of whether parties can be presumed to have 
intended, upon the conclusion of the treaty, to give a term used a meaning 
that is capable of evolving over time.35 
 
 
31. Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Arg. v. Uru.), Judgement, 2010 I.C.J. Rep. 14, ¶ 
64 (Apr. 20); Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities 
with Respect to Activities in the Area, Advisory Opinion, 2011 ITLOS Rep. 10, ¶ 57. 
32. RICHARD GARDINER, TREATY INTERPRETATION 30 (2008). 
33. VILLIGER, supra note 24, at 436. 
34. See, e.g., Frits Kalshoven, The Undertaking to Respect and Ensure Respect in All Circum-
stances: From Tiny Seed to Ripening Fruit, 2 YEARBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN 
LAW 3, 54 (1999). 











The parties’ intention can thus be defined as the result one reaches if the 
general rule of interpretation is applied correctly.36 Correct application 
means that the travaux préparatoires may be considered in certain circum-
stances but are far from the only thing to consider. Notably, subsequent 
practice is also relevant. This article takes as its starting point that, in this 
sense, treaty interpretation can be evolutionary.37 
 
IV. THE RULES OF TREATY INTERPRETATION APPLIED                           
TO COMMON ARTICLE 1 
 
A. Ordinary Meaning 
 
The element of ordinary meaning of terms implies a textual approach. The 
starting point in the process of interpretation is a linguistic and grammatical 
analysis of the text of the treaty, looking for meaning that is regular, normal, 
or customary.38 It is usual to look at the dictionary meaning of a term when 
trying to ascertain its ordinary meaning. The dictionary meaning of “ensure” 
is “make certain that (something) will occur or be so.”39 The meaning of 
“respect” is “to have respect for; avoid harming or interfering with; agree or 
recognize and observe (a law, rule, etc.).”40 These definitions do not shed 
much light on the meaning of the term “ensure respect” in common Article 
1.  
Some authors assert that when interpreting a treaty provision’s ordinary 
meaning it is appropriate to look to other rules of international law.41 How-
ever, this does not appear to be the usual way the ordinary meaning element 
is understood. Other rules of international law do play a role in treaty inter-
pretation under Article 31(3)(c), but the only relevant rules are those appli-
cable between the parties to the treaty being interpreted. In other words, as 
 
36. EIRIK BJORGE, THE EVOLUTIONARY INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES 63 (2013). 
37. For the purposes of this article, it is not necessary to elaborate further on the debate 
concerning evolutionary interpretation of treaties. For further information, see, e.g., Pierre-
Marie Dupuy, Evolutionary Interpretation of Treaties: Between Memory and Prophecy, in THE LAW 
OF TREATIES BEYOND THE VIENNA CONVENTION 123 (Enzo Cannizzaro ed., 2011); Mar-
tin Dawidowicz, The Effect of the Passage of Time on the Interpretation of Treaties: Some Reflections on 
Costa Rica v. Nicaragua, 24 LEIDEN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 201 (2011). 
38. GARDINER, supra note 32, 164. 
39. NEW POCKET OXFORD DICTIONARY 297 (Catherine Soanes ed., 2001).  
40. Id. at 769. 
















The element of context in treaty interpretation directs attention to the whole 
text of the treaty, its preamble, and, where applicable, annexes.42 Some au-
thors note that most of the obligations set forth in the Geneva Conventions 
are imposed only on States that are party to the conflict. They suggest that 
this points toward an interpretation of common Article 1 that does not in-
clude an external element.43 However, where provisions of the Geneva Con-
ventions impose obligations only on parties to the conflict, they generally 
use the term “Party to the conflict” or “belligerent.”44 This suggests that 
where the term “High Contracting Parties” is used, such as in common Ar-
ticle 1, this means something other than parties to the conflict. Michael 
Schmitt and Sean Watts put forward that the Conventions “expressly set 
forth the situations in which States must or may act vis-à-vis the activities of 
other States.”45 As an example, they point to Article 12 of Geneva Conven-
tion III, which imposes a duty to monitor the treatment accorded prisoners 
of war who have been transferred to another State.46  
It is certainly true that this and several other provisions in the Geneva 
Conventions refer clearly to the relationship between different parties to the 
Conventions. This does not mean that this is the case for all their provisions, 
however. For instance, Article 131 of Geneva Convention III provides that 
“[n]o High Contracting Party shall be allowed to absolve itself or any other 
High Contracting Party of any liability incurred by itself or by another High 
Contracting Party” for grave breaches. Article 131 does not mention the 
State that would hold the High Contracting Party concerned liable, even 
though there clearly must be such other State.  
Some commentators maintain that the instruments specifically contem-
plate roles for certain States in fostering compliance by belligerent States. 
Most significant among these roles is service by neutral States as Protecting 
Powers on behalf of belligerent States.47 It could well be argued, however, 
 
42. GARDINER, supra note 32, at 177. 
43. See, e.g., Schmitt & Watts, supra note 5, at 679. 
44. See, e.g., Geneva Convention I, supra note 1, arts. 12–16.  
45. Schmitt & Watts, supra note 5, at 686. 












that Protecting Powers are given a number of very specific responsibilities 
and powers, which do not exclude the more general obligations of High 
Contracting Powers.48 In addition, an argument that only (or at least primar-
ily) Protecting Powers are charged with ensuring compliance by parties to a 
conflict would be stronger if it were obligatory for parties to a conflict to 
appoint a Protecting Power. If there were such an obligation, it would ensure 
there would always be a State monitoring compliance. However, this is not 
how common Article 8 (Article 9 of Geneva Convention IV) of the Con-
ventions is presently understood.49 Since 1949 the appointment of Protect-
ing Powers has been the exception rather than the rule in IACs.50 It would 
seem that the failure to appoint a Protecting Power is not, at least in the eyes 
of most States, seen as a violation of their treaty obligations.51 
The Geneva Conventions use the term “ensure” in a number of other 
articles beyond common Article 1. Examples from Geneva Convention IV 
include Articles 24, 39, 49, 93, 127, and 130. In these other articles, “ensure” 
clearly refers only to compliance by the State itself, excluding an external 
element. This, it has been argued, militates against an external element being 
included in common Article 1.52 On the other hand, these articles generally 
describe the holder of the obligation concerned as “the Party to the conflict,” 
“the Detaining Power,” or a similar term which makes clear that these obli-
gations are imposed only on States directly involved in the conflict. In that 
sense, these articles differ from common Article 1, which imposes an obli-
gation on all the High Contracting Parties, so it is doubtful that the meaning 
of the term “ensure” in those articles is instructive for determining its mean-
ing in common Article 1. 
Article 31(2) VCLT provides that the context for the purpose of treaty 
interpretation includes any agreement relating to the treaty made between all 
the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty, as well as any 
instrument made by one or more parties in connection with the conclusion 
 
48. In this sense, see Laurence Boisson de Chazournes & Luigi Condorelli, Common 
Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions Revisited: Protecting Collective Interests, 82 INTERNATIONAL RE-
VIEW OF THE RED CROSS 67, at 76 (2000). 
49. See, e.g., ICRC, 2017 UPDATED COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION II, supra 
note 21, at 380–81. 
50. See, e.g., Toni Pfanner, Various Mechanisms and Approaches for Implementing International 
Humanitarian law and Protecting and Assisting War Victims, 91 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE 
RED CROSS 279, 287 (2009). 
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of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument related to 
the treaty. There are no agreements or instruments that fit this description 
in relation to the Geneva Conventions. 
 
C. Object and Purpose 
 
According to the general rule of treaty interpretation, the terms of a treaty 
must be read in the light of their object and purpose. This is essentially a 
teleological exercise.53 It gives expression to the assumption that a provision 
is intended to advance the general objective of the treaty of which it is a 
part.54 There are different ways to determine the object and purpose of a 
treaty. It is common to refer to the preamble; the title may also be of assis-
tance. In other cases, the type of treaty may itself give rise to an assumption 
of a particular object and purpose.55  
The titles of the four Geneva Conventions provide some indication of 
their object and purpose, that is the protection of specific groups of persons, 
either members of armed forces who have been placed hors de combat or ci-
vilians. Such an object and purpose militate in favor of an external element 
because doing so contributes to the implementation of the Conventions and 
thus lessens the suffering of the groups they protect. 
The four Geneva Conventions do not contain a preamble to provide 
information on the motivations of the drafters. However, for Geneva Con-
ventions I and III, reference may be had to the 1929 Geneva Conventions 
that preceded them. This is because, as expressed in Articles 59 and 134, 
respectively, their purpose is to replace the 1929 Convention for the Ame-
lioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in Armies in the Field 
and the 1929 Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. The 
1929 Conventions do contain preambles, which underline the humanitarian 
nature of those Conventions.56 It may be inferred that this was also the 
 
53. GARDINER, supra note 32, at 189. 
54. Oliver Dörr, Article 31: General Rule of Interpretation, in THE VIENNA CONVENTION 
ON THE LAW OF TREATIES, supra note 28, at 557, 584. 
55. Id. at 585. 
56. 1929 Prisoners of War Convention, supra note 10, pmbl. (“to mitigate as far as 
possible, the inevitable rigours [of war] thereof and to alleviate the condition of prisoners 
of war”); 1929 Convention for the Wounded and Sick in the Field, supra note 11, pmbl. (“to 











motivation of the drafters of the 1949 Conventions I and III.57 Such an ob-
ject and purpose suggest an external element because such an element con-
tributes to achieving humanitarian aims. 
 
D. Agreements and Instruments Made in Connection with Conclusion of a Treaty 
 
Article 31(2) VCLT provides that the context for the purpose of interpreta-
tion of a treaty includes any agreement relating to the treaty that was made 
between all the parties in connection with the conclusion of the treaty, as 
well as any instrument made by one or more parties in connection with the 
conclusion of the treaty and accepted by the other parties as an instrument 
related to the treaty. There are no agreements or instruments that fit this 
description to assist in interpreting the Geneva Conventions. 
 
E. Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent Practice 
 
Article 31(2) VCLT refers to treaties and instruments concluded contempo-
raneously with the treaty being interpreted. Article 31(3) provides that sub-
sequent agreements and practice are also part of the context.  
At first sight, Additional Protocols I, II, and III would seem to qualify 
as relevant subsequent agreements. However, on closer inspection, this is 
not the case. This is because the only relevant subsequent agreements are 
those concluded between “the Parties.” “The Parties” means all the parties 
to the treaty being interpreted.58 None of the Additional Protocols have been 
ratified by all of the High Contracting Parties to the 1949 Conventions. 
Therefore, these agreements cannot be considered in establishing the con-
text of the terms of the Geneva Conventions. 
Subsequent practice that may be considered is limited to practice in the 
application of a treaty that establishes the agreement of the parties regarding 
its interpretation. As in the case of subsequent agreements, “parties” refers 
to all parties to the treaty. This does not mean that all parties to the treaty 
must have contributed to the practice. What is required is not that the prac-
tice is in fact the practice of all parties, but that the practice establishes the 
 
57. ICRC, 2016 UPDATED COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION I, supra note 4, ¶ 
112; ICRC, 2021 UPDATED COMMENTARY TO GENEVA CONVENTION III, supra note 4, ¶ 
144. 
58. ULF LINDERFALK, ON THE INTERPRETATION OF TREATIES: THE MODERN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AS EXPRESSED IN THE 1969 VIENNA CONVENTION ON THE LAW OF TREA-











agreement of all parties regarding its interpretation. Such a practice will not 
necessarily be a practice to which all parties themselves have contributed. All 
parties must, however, have acquiesced in the interpretation.59 If the circum-
stances justify the assumption that a party has consented, even though the 
party itself did not contribute to the practice, then this is sufficient.60 The 
ILC’s draft conclusions on treaty interpretation have further clarified that for 
there to be “agreement of the parties” in the sense of Article 31(3)(b), a 
“common understanding” is required “regarding the interpretation of a 
treaty which the parties are aware of and accept.”61 Subsequent practice in 
the sense of Article 31(3)(b) needs to be “concordant, common, and con-
sistent” to be taken into account.62 
There is practice of the High Contracting Parties in the application of 
common Article 1 that supports the existence of an external element. This 
practice is not abundant, but the abundance of practice is not necessary for 
such practice to be included in the interpretation of the provision. What is 
required, again, is that this practice establishes the agreement of the parties. 
Because a small number of State parties to the Geneva Conventions have 
expressly rejected an interpretation that includes an external element, the 
available practice does not meet this requirement.63  
 
F. Relevant Rules of International Law 
 
Relevant rules of international law applicable to the relations between the 
parties must also be considered in interpreting a treaty. The reference to in-
ternational law must be understood as international law as it stands at the 
time the treaty is being interpreted, not at the time it was concluded.64 The 
obligation to take international law into account is limited to rules that are 
relevant. It is not clear whether “parties” refers to all parties to the treaty 
being interpreted or only the parties to a specific dispute.65 The former would 
limit the number of rules of international law that must be considered, par-
ticularly in interpreting treaties like the Geneva Conventions that have been 
universally ratified.  
 
59. Id. at 167. 
60. Id. 
61. ILC Draft Conclusions, supra note 24, at 193. 
62. GARDINER, supra note 32, at 227. 
63. Schmitt & Watts, supra note 5, at 689–93. 
64. GARDINER, supra note 32, at 251. 











A number of authors opposing an interpretation of common Article 1 
that includes an external dimension refer to the broader system of interna-
tional law of which the Geneva Conventions are part. One commentator, 
for example, proffers that “States do not ordinarily assume responsibility for 
ensuring other States’ compliance with international law.”66 Others consider 
that imbuing the term “ensure respect” with an external component would 
be unusual from an international law perspective. In their view, States are 
seldom responsible for ensuring other States’ compliance with international 
law.67 This statement is true, but it does not necessarily lead to the conclusion 
that common Article 1 does not have an external dimension.  
The Geneva Conventions also differ from many international agree-
ments in other ways. Consider, for example, common Article 3, which im-
poses obligations specifically on non-State actors. In addition, it may be un-
usual for a treaty to impose an obligation relating to respect by other States, 
but there are examples of such treaties. A case in point is the Convention on 
the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Article I of this 
Convention contains an undertaking by the Contracting Parties to prevent 
and punish genocide.68 The ICJ has found that the obligation to prevent gen-
ocide includes an external element, in that it places States under positive ob-
ligations to do their best to ensure that genocidal acts do not occur.69 It is 
noteworthy that the Genocide Convention was adopted in December 1948; 
in other words, in the same period that the Geneva Conventions were being 
drafted. It is unlikely that the drafters of those Conventions would have been 
unaware of the Genocide Convention.  
If, and only if, the term “parties” as used in Article 31(3)(c) VCLT is read 
as not encompassing all parties to a treaty, can relevant treaties that have not 
been as widely ratified as the Geneva Conventions be taken into considera-
tion. Under that reading, Additional Protocols I and III would then be rele-
vant because the drafters of these treaties copied the wording of common 
Article 1 verbatim.70 There was, however, little discussion of the meaning of 
this Article during the negotiation of the Protocols. As a consequence, the 
 
66. Robson, supra note 5, at 104. 
67. Schmitt & Watts, supra note 5, at 685. 
68. Convention in the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 1, 
Dec. 9, 1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277. 
69. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Montenegro), Judgment, 2007 I.C.J. Rep. 43, ¶ 432 
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drafting history is somewhat inconclusive on the matter.71 In the words of 
Frits Kalshoven, there is almost nothing in the drafting history of Additional 
Protocol I “that could be relied upon one way or another in explaining the 
meaning of its text.”72 
It has been suggested that because Additional Protocol I sets forth sev-
eral specific mechanisms for ensuring compliance by other States, this is ev-
idence that its drafters did not rely on Article 1 to imply such remedial 
measures.73 The fact that the Protocol includes specific measures does not 
in and of itself exclude the possibility of an overarching obligation that may 
be implemented both through those measures and the use of others not 
mentioned.  
 
G. Supplementary Means: Other Practice 
 
Whereas Article 31 VCLT deals with the general rule on treaty interpretation, 
Article 32 provides for the use of supplementary means of interpretation. 
Unlike in Article 31, these means do not have to be used but merely may be 
used, and then only in two situations. First, in “order to confirm the meaning 
resulting from the application of article 31,” or second, to “determine the 
meaning when the interpretation according to article 31: (a) leaves the mean-
ing ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads to a result which is manifestly absurd 
or unreasonable.” Given the discussion in the preceding Sections, it appears 
that the application of the elements of interpretation in Article 31 leaves the 
meaning of common Article 1 ambiguous. Different elements point in dif-
ferent directions concerning whether or not the article has an external di-
mension. This justifies using supplementary means of interpretation.  
Article 32 does not contain a list of supplementary means. It only pro-
vides that they include the preparatory work of the treaty and the circum-
stances of its conclusion. It appears that State practice that does not meet 
the criteria of Article 31 also falls within this category. According to the ILC 
special rapporteur on subsequent agreements and subsequent practice in re-
lation to the interpretation of treaties, Georg Nolte: “The taking into account 
of other treaty practice by States for the purpose of interpretation should not 
be excluded at the outset, since it may in some situations serve as a supple-
mentary means of interpretation in the sense of article 32 of the 
 
71. Geiss, supra note 2, at 121. 
72. Kalshoven, supra note 34, at 47. 











Convention.”74 This view was accepted by the ILC. Conclusion 2 paragraph 
4 of the draft conclusions on subsequent agreements and subsequent prac-
tice in relation to the interpretation of treaties provides that “Recourse may 
be had to other subsequent practice in the application of the treaty as a sup-
plementary means of interpretation under article 32.”75 
This is confirmed in the literature on Article 32.76 It is also supported by 
the case law of various international courts and tribunals, including the ICJ.77 
Thus, the fact that practice does not establish the agreement of all parties 
does not necessarily exclude it from being taken into account.78 
There is a body of practice that fits this description in relation to com-
mon Article 1, although to say that it is abundant may be overstating the 
case.79 Part of this practice suggests that States parties to the Geneva Con-
vention accept that the article has an external dimension.  
First, there is the practice of individual State parties to the Geneva Con-
ventions. The government of the Netherlands, for example, has on several 
occasions referred to an external dimension. In 2016, the Minister of De-
fense stated in response to questions from Parliament concerning the alleged 
use of intelligence provided by the Netherlands to the United States in un-
lawful killings, that: 
 
On the basis of international humanitarian law, the government has a duty 
to observe and enforce international humanitarian law. This means that if 
the government knows that a partner uses or will use information provided 
by the Netherlands to commit violations of international law and / or in-
ternational humanitarian law, the question whether such information is 
shared with that partner will have to be answered again.80 
 
 
74. Georg Nolte (Special Rapporteur), First Report on Subsequent Agreements and Subsequent 
Practice in Relation to the Interpretation of Treaties, ¶ 107, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/660 (Mar, 19, 2013). 
75. ILC Draft Conclusions, supra note 24, at 120. 
76. See, e.g., Dörr & Schmalenbach, supra note 28, at 627. 
77. Kasikili/Sedudu Island (Bots./Namib.), Judgment, 1999 I.C.J. Rep. 1045, ¶¶ 55, 80 
(Dec. 13). For other case law of international courts and tribunals, see ILC Draft Conclu-
sions, supra note 24, at 126–28. 
78. Luigi Sbolci, Supplementary Means of Interpretation, in THE LAW OF TREATIES BEYOND 
THE VIENNA CONVENTION, supra note 37, at 145, 158.  
79. For a statement that practice is abundant, see Geiss, supra note 17, at 121. 
80. Parliamentary Papers (Appendix) 2015-2016, No. 1177 (Jan. 18, 2016), https://zo 
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In another set of answers to questions from Parliament, the Dutch gov-
ernment stated,  “The Netherlands does not cooperate with parties that use 
child soldiers. This policy is based among other things on the obligation in 
International Humanitarian Law to ensure respect for that body of law.”81  
State practice by France also supports an external element. As noted by 
Birgit Kessler, 
 
[in 1977] members of the POLISARIO kidnapped several French citizens 
on Mauritanian territory. In order to resolve the crisis, the French Foreign 
Minister addressed Algeria which openly supported the POLISARIO. By 
referring to common Article 1, France reminded Algeria of its duty as a 
Member State of the Geneva Conventions to respect and to “ensure re-
spect” of the Conventions under all circumstances. Algeria would, there-
fore, have been obliged not to support a violation of the prohibition on 
kidnapping.82 
 
Another statement to the effect that common Article 1 has an external di-
mension was made by Oman in the Special Political Committee of the UN 
General Assembly.83 
Other State practice can be found in written submissions made to the 
ICJ in the Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian 
Territory case. In its submission, Switzerland referenced the Conference of 
High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention held on July 15, 
1999. It noted that the Conference discussed action to be taken to apply the 
Convention in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, 
and to ensure respect for its provisions in accordance with common Article 
1 of the four Geneva Conventions.84 In the same case, the League of Arab 
States submitted a written statement that supports an external element. The 
statement notes that other States have a right to “take lawful measures 
against Israel to ensure the cessation of the breach and reparation in the 
 
81. Parliamentary Papers 2014–2015, no. 3337 (Kamerstukken 2014- 2015, Aanhangsel, 
nr. 3337, Sept. 10, 2015). 
82. Birgit Kessler, The Duty to Ensure Respect under Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conven-
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U.N. Doc. A/PSC/35/SR.27 (Nov. 11, 1980), cited in ANDREAS KOLB, THE UN SECURITY 
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interest of the injured State or of the beneficiaries of the obligation 
breached.”85 It continues by stating, “In relation to international humanitar-
ian law, this right even constitutes a duty according to common article 1 of 
the Conventions.”86 
The Member States of the European Union (EU) have adopted a so-
called “Common Position,” defining common rules governing the control 
of exports of military technology and equipment.87 The EU Council en-
dorsed a “user’s guide” to the Common Position on July 20, 2005.88 This 
guide summarizes agreed guidance for the interpretation and implementa-
tion of the Common Position’s articles. It contains the following reference 
to Common Article 1: 
 
Common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions is generally interpreted as 
conferring a responsibility on third party states not involved in an armed 
conflict to not encourage a party to an armed conflict to violate interna-
tional humanitarian law, nor to take action that would assist in such viola-
tions, and to take appropriate steps to cause such violations to cease. They 
have a particular responsibility to intervene with states or armed groups 
over which they might have some influence. Arms producing and export-
ing states can be considered particularly influential in “ensuring respect” 
for international humanitarian law due to their ability to provide or with-
hold the means by which certain serious violations are carried out. They 
should therefore exercise particular caution to ensure that their export is 
not used to commit serious violations of international humanitarian law.89 
 
Other relevant practice are the declarations adopted by the Conference 
of High Contracting Parties to Geneva Convention IV. Such a conference 
was convened in 1999, only to be adjourned. It reconvened in 2001 and again 
 
85. Wall Advisory Opinion, Written Statement by the League of Arab States 105, 
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in 2014.90 Both in 2001 and 2014, the Conference adopted a declaration. For 
the purposes of this article, the Declaration adopted by the 2001 Conference, 
in which 114 States participated, is particularly relevant. It states, inter alia, 
“The participating High Contracting Parties call upon all parties, directly in-
volved in the conflict or not, to respect and to ensure respect for the Geneva 
Conventions in all circumstances, to disseminate and take measures neces-
sary for the prevention and suppression of breaches of the Conventions.”91 
Other relevant practice has been described by others, including, in par-
ticular, Knut Dörmann and Jose Serralvo.92 It includes certain statements by 
States, as well as resolutions of the UN Security Council and General As-
sembly. A description of this practice need not be repeated here.  
It must be noted that the practice is not uniform, however. There is some 
recent practice by States parties to the Geneva Conventions that interprets 
common Article 1 as not including an external dimension, including the 
statement by the then-U.S. State Department Legal Adviser Brian Egan cited 
previously.93   
In Daniel Turp v. the Minister of Foreign Affairs, the Canadian government 
argued before the Federal Court of Canada, among other things, that com-
mon Article 1 does not have an external dimension.94 The court’s judgment 
did not address this issue because it considered that the obligation in com-
mon Article 1 is limited to IACs. As the case concerned the conflict in 
Yemen, which the court held to be a NIAC in which Canada was not in-
volved, it concluded that the obligation to ensure respect was not applica-
ble.95   
Practice rejecting an external dimension appears at this moment to be 
much more limited than the practice referred to above that supports an 
 
90. See Matthias Lanz, Emilie Max & Oliver Hoehne, The Conference of High Contracting 
Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention of 17 December 2014 and the Duty to Ensure Respect for 
International Humanitarian Law, 96 INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF THE RED CROSS 1115 
(2014). 
91. Conference of High Contracting Parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention, Decla-
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92. Dörmann & Serralvo, supra note 13, at 716–19. 
93. See supra note 22 and accompanying text. 
94. Daniel Turp. v. Minister of Foreign Affairs, [2017] F.C. 84, ¶ 22 (Can.). 











external dimension.96 This raises the question of how consistent and wide-
spread practice must be in order to be taken into account in treaty interpre-
tation. The standard in this context must be distinguished from the require-
ments for the formation of new international customary law.97 It was pointed 
out above that State practice must be concordant, common, and consistent 
in applying Article 31(2) VCLT. In the broader sense in which State practice 
is used in Article 32, however, this standard does not appear to apply. The 
ILC lists several examples in which international courts and tribunals have 
taken into account State practice that was neither frequent nor necessarily 
uniform.98 The ILC also stressed, however, that the distinction between 
agreed subsequent practice under Article 31(3)(b), as an authentic means of 
interpretation, and other subsequent practice (in a broad sense) under Article 
32, implies that a greater interpretative value should be attributed to the for-
mer.99  
 
H. Supplementary Means: Travaux Préparatoires  
 
As discussed above, Article 32 VCLT allows the use of the travaux prépa-
ratoires to interpret a treaty to confirm the meaning resulting from the appli-
cation of Article 31 or to determine the meaning when the interpretation 
under Article 31, (a) leaves the meaning ambiguous or obscure; or (b) leads 
to a result which is manifestly absurd or unreasonable.100  
 
96. Note that some authors also refer to an online contribution by an Australian gov-
ernment adviser as opposing an external dimension. The text of the contribution does not 
include such a statement, however. Rather, it discusses issues surrounding the scope and 
content of an external dimension, suggesting the existence of such a dimension in the first 
place. John Reid, Ensuring Respect: The Role of State Practice in Ensuring Respect for the Conventions, 
ILA REPORTER, http://ilareporter.org.au/2016/11/ensuring-respect-the-role-of-state-prac 
tice-in-interpreting-the-geneva-conventions-john-reid/ (last visited Mar. 11, 2021).  
97. This distinction is not made by Robson, who states:  
 
The preponderance of subsequent State practice in the application of the Geneva Conven-
tions supports the view that there is no legal obligation to bring an end to others’ breaches. 
To support a rule of custom, State practice must be “sufficiently widespread and representa-
tive, as well as consistent”, where “consistent” means “extensive and virtually uniform.”  
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It can be argued that the application of the general rule of treaty inter-
pretation leaves the meaning of common Article 1 ambiguous. And to the 
extent a meaning does emerge after its application, it is useful to determine 
whether the travaux préparatoires confirm this meaning. 
The travaux préparatoires of the Geneva Conventions do not contain much 
concerning common Article 1. The insertion of the obligation to ensure re-
spect was proposed by the ICRC in its draft of the four conventions submit-
ted to the Stockholm International Conference of the Red Cross in 1948. 
The text was included in a booklet, which also contained remarks on the text 
by the ICRC, made available to all National Red Cross Societies and govern-
ments participating in the Stockholm Conference. 
After the Stockholm Conference closed, the ICRC proposed a draft pre-
amble for all four conventions. The third paragraph provided that the con-
tracting States undertook to respect, and to ensure respect for, the conven-
tions in all circumstances. The recommendation from the ICRC was that its 
draft preamble be included in article 1 of all the conventions. The four draft 
conventions approved at the Stockholm Conference and the ICRC’s new 
proposals, including a preamble, were transmitted to the governments in-
vited to participate in the 1949 Geneva Conference.101 
When the final version of common Article 1 was discussed at the Geneva 
Conference in 1949, only a handful of delegations made a statement. The 
Italian delegate, Mr. Maresca, stated that he felt that “the terms ‘undertake 
to ensure respect’ should be more clearly defined. According to the manner 
in which they were construed, they were either redundant, or introduced a 
new concept into international law.”102 
The Norwegian and U.S. delegates stated that they considered that the 
object of this article was to ensure respect of the conventions by the popu-
lation as a whole.103 The French delegate stated that he considered that the 
term “ensure respect” had the same purpose as the expression “in the name 
of their peoples” that had been deleted in Stockholm.104 The ICRC repre-
sentative pointed out that in submitting its proposals to the Stockholm Con-
ference, the ICRC emphasized that the contracting parties should not be 
confined to applying the conventions to themselves but should do all in their 
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power to see that the basic humanitarian principles of the conventions were 
universally applied.105  
The statements by the Norwegian and United States representatives do 
not suggest an external dimension, nor does that of the French representa-
tive. The statement by the ICRC representative, in particular the use of the 
word “universal,” can be read as indicating an external dimension. It has 
been argued by Kalshoven, however, that the word “universal” was used as 
a way to ensure compliance with the Geneva Conventions by all parties to a 
NIAC, rather than as implying an external dimension.106 In contrast, Dör-
mann and Serralvo argue that some aspects of the travaux préparatoires may 
prompt a different understanding.107 They point, in particular, to the remarks 
made by the ICRC in the booklet referred to above. They interpret those 
remarks as referring to an external dimension, and state that since these re-
marks had been distributed to all the participants it is unlikely that delegates 
had a narrow understanding of the undertaking to ensure respect. Dörmann 
and Serralvo conclude the delegates “chose a broad formulation that accom-
modates an external scope, be it in terms of an entitlement or a duty.”108 
Taking into account the diametrically opposed conclusions that different 
commentators draw from the travaux préparatoires, it is clear they do not pro-
vide a conclusive answer to the question of whether the drafters considered 
that common Article 1 had an external dimension.109  
In any event, it must be remembered that the travaux préparatoires are not 
the only means to determine the drafters’ intention. As the ILC states in its 
commentary to the draft conclusions on subsequent agreements and subse-
quent practice in relation to treaties: 
 
the travaux préparatoires are not the primary basis for determining the pre-
sumed intention of the parties, but they are only, as article 32 indicates, a 
supplementary means of interpretation. And although interpretation must 
seek to identify the intention of the parties, this must be done by the inter-
preter on the basis of the means of interpretation that are available at the 
time of the act of interpretation and that include subsequent agreements 
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and subsequent practice of parties to the treaty. The interpreter thus has to 
answer the question of whether parties can be presumed to have intended, 
upon the conclusion of the treaty, to give a term used a meaning that is 
capable of evolving over time.110  
 
The travaux préparatoires do not appear to exclude the possibility that the 
meaning of ensure respect could develop over time. And as was discussed 
above, there is a body of practice that “supports the interpretation of Com-
mon Article 1 as a rule that compels all States, whether or not parties to a 
conflict, not only to take active part in ensuring compliance with rules of 
international humanitarian law by all concerned, but also to react against vi-
olations of that law.”111 
 
I. The International Court of Justice 
 
The ICJ’s pronouncements on common Article 1 are often referred to by 
commentators. Strictly speaking, such pronouncements do not have an au-
tonomous role to play in the interpretation of the Geneva Conventions. 
They do not constitute “subsequent practice” for the purposes of Articles 
31(3)(b) and 32 VCLT.112 Judgments and other pronouncements of interna-
tional courts, tribunals, and expert treaty bodies, however, may be indirectly 
relevant to the identification of subsequent agreements and subsequent prac-
tice as authentic means of interpretation if they reflect, give rise to, or refer 
to such subsequent agreements and practice of the parties themselves.113 
Notwithstanding these apparent limitations on the utility of the ICJ’s pro-
nouncements, its views are generally accorded great weight and warrant dis-
cussion.  
The ICJ first referred to the obligation to ensure respect in its judgment 
in the Nicaragua case. In it, the Court considered that the United States had 
an obligation 
 
in the terms of Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions to “respect” the Con-
ventions and even “to ensure respect” for them “in all circumstances”. . . . 
The United States is thus under an obligation not to encourage persons or 
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groups engaged in the conflict in Nicaragua to act in violation of the pro-
visions of Article 3 common to the four 1949 Geneva Conventions.114 
 
The formulation used by the Court leaves no doubt that it considered that 
the obligation to ensure respect encompasses an external element. 
The ICJ came back to common Article 1 in its advisory opinion in the 
Wall case. It held that: “all the States parties to the [fourth] Geneva Conven-
tion . . . are under an obligation, while respecting the United Nations Charter 
and international law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international hu-
manitarian law.”115  
It has been argued that the Wall case is of particular relevance in that the 
Court opined that the obligations found in common Article 1 are erga omnes, 
and, therefore, all States had an obligation to ensure Israel’s compliance with 
Geneva Convention IV.116 This appears to be a misreading of the advisory 
opinion. In that opinion, the Court made a distinction between the conse-
quences of IHL obligations being erga omnes in nature on the one hand and 
the obligation to “ensure respect” on the other.117 The Court discussed the 
notion of obligations erga omnes (in paragraphs 155–157) and then applied the 
notion to the field of IHL (in paragraph 157). First, the Court recalled its 
holding in its Nuclear Weapons advisory opinion: 
 
[A] great many rules of humanitarian law applicable in armed conflict are 
so fundamental to the respect of the human person and “elementary con-
siderations of humanity” . . ., that they are “to be observed by all States 
whether or not they have ratified the conventions that contain them, be-
cause they constitute intransgressible principles of international customary 
law.”118   
 
The Court then continued by stating, “In the Court’s view, these rules incor-
porate obligations which are essentially of an erga omnes character.”119  
The next paragraph of the advisory opinion dealt with common Article 
1 and merits to be recited in full:  
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The Court would also emphasize that Article 1 of the Fourth Geneva 
Convention, a provision common to the four Geneva Conventions, pro-
vides that “The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and to en-
sure respect for the present Convention in all circumstances.” It follows 
from that provision that every State party to that Convention, whether or 
not it is a party to a specific conflict, is under an obligation to ensure that 
the requirements of the instruments in question are complied with.120 
 
The formulation used by the Court implies that it considers the obligation in 
common Article 1 to be an autonomous, treaty-based obligation, independ-
ent of whether IHL includes obligations erga omnes. Otherwise, it would not 
have been logical for the Court to refer only to an obligation that is borne 
by States parties to Geneva Convention IV. Erga omnes obligations are, after 
all, owed to all States.  
The conclusion is supported elsewhere in the advisory opinion where  
the Court specifically noted that “Certain participants in the proceedings fur-
ther contended that the States parties to the Fourth Geneva Convention are 
obliged to take measures to ensure compliance with the Convention.”121 This 
is a reference to the written statements made by Switzerland and the League 
of Arab States discussed earlier. Those statements did not link the issue of 
erga omnes to the obligation in common Article 1. If the Court disagreed with 
the contention made in those statements, it would have been logical for it to 
so state at this point. 
A second indication is found in paragraph 159 of the advisory opinion. 
Here, the Court started by stating “[g]iven the character and the importance 
of the rights and obligations involved” it “is of the view that all States are 
under an obligation not to recognize the illegal situation resulting from the 
construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory.”122 This ref-
erence to the character of the rights is undoubtedly a reference to their erga 
omnes character. The Court deals with the obligation to ensure respect further 
in the same paragraph, without linking this obligation to the character of 
IHL obligations: 
  
In addition, all the States parties to the Geneva Convention relative to the 
Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of 12 August 1949 are under 
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an obligation, while respecting the United Nations Charter and interna-
tional law, to ensure compliance by Israel with international humanitarian 
law as embodied in that Convention.123 
 
It seems that the Court maintained a distinction between the conse-
quences that follow from the violation of obligations erga omnes on the one 
hand and the obligation to ensure respect in common Article 1 on the other. 
This also follows from the dissenting opinion of Judge Kooijmans. He disa-
greed with the Court’s interpretation that common Article 1 has an external 
dimension but stated his understanding that the Court based its interpreta-




This article has attempted to establish the meaning of the term “ensure re-
spect” in common Article 1 of the Geneva Conventions, specifically whether 
it includes an external element. It has done this by applying the rules on 
treaty interpretation set out in Articles 31 and 32 VCLT. While the method-
ology used may seem somewhat formalistic, it is submitted that such formal-
ism helps by drawing out the different elements that play a role in treaty 
interpretation. Some of the literature on common Article 1 does not even 
acknowledge that establishing the meaning of the Article is a matter of treaty 
interpretation for which specific rules exist. Some commentators, as noted 
above, apply certain rules of treaty interpretation in a questionable way.125 
Applying the rules of treaty interpretation correctly to common Article 
1, however, does not necessarily mean that an unequivocal answer can be 
provided to the question of whether that Article contains an external dimen-
sion. In the framework of the general rule of interpretation (Article 31 
VCLT), arguments concerning common Article 1’s scope were analyzed and 
discarded. Others were found to be valid but not sufficient to avoid ambi-
guity on the question of whether common Article 1 contains an external 
dimension.  
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Consequently, supplementary means of interpretation were resorted to, 
as set out in Article 32 VCLT. These include the travaux préparatoires and State 
practice. Although it has been argued that the travaux préparatoires make it 
clear that the drafters did not intend to include an external element, here too, 
analysis of the available material failed to provide a conclusive answer as to 
whether common Article 1 has an external element. Even if it is concluded 
from the travaux that the drafters did not have an external dimension in mind, 
this does not mean that an interpretation in 2021 must lead to the same result 
since, under Article 32, State practice occurring since 1949 may be consid-
ered.  
In that regard, it was shown that the majority of State practice appears 
to accept such an external dimension to common Article 1, although there 
are a few States that have rejected such an interpretation. Thus, State practice 
cannot be considered in the context of Article 31(3)(b)’s standard requiring 
practice be consistent and widespread. Practice may, however, be used as a 
supplementary means. The question is then how much State practice there 
needs to be in order to draw conclusions from it. The rules of treaty inter-
pretation do not provide an answer to this question, although international 
courts and tribunals have considered practice by only one or a few States.  
On balance, the available practice is sufficient to conclude that common 
Article 1 includes an external dimension. In this context, the premise in the 
introduction of this article that there is additional State practice beyond that 
generally referred to in the literature in common Article 1 was confirmed. 
The additional practice was found from, inter alia, the Netherlands, Switzer-
land, and all the Member States of the European Union. This supports the 
conclusion that an understanding of common Article 1 that includes an ex-
ternal dimension has come to prevail.126  
As was stated in the introduction, this article has not addressed the con-
tent of an external obligation to ensure respect; in other words, what the 
obligation requires of High Contracting Parties to the Geneva Conventions. 
Obviously, the answer to that question is of great importance in determining 
the precise impact of such an obligation. If, for example, it only requires 
States not to encourage other States to commit violations of IHL, the impact 
is relatively limited. If it requires positive action, on the other hand, the im-
pact will be greater.  
Some commentators point to the negative practical consequences that 
they consider an external dimension to common Article 1 would have. These 
 











consequences would only play a role in interpreting the Article if they led to 
the conclusion that an interpretation that common Article 1 has an external 
element would be manifestly absurd or unreasonable. As became clear 
above, in such a case, Article 32 VCLT permits recourse to subsidiary means 
of interpretation. Those means were already taken into account in the anal-
ysis above, however.   
In any event, the negative consequences that are referred to are not con-
vincing. They boil down to the suggestion that an obligation for States to 
ensure respect by other parties to the Geneva Conventions will harm rather 
than help to increase compliance. It is difficult to see how States taking ac-
tion to strengthen compliance by other States would “erode the Conven-
tions’ status as vital legal common ground between States during armed con-
flict.”127 On the contrary, at a time when IHL is under strain, it is more im-
portant than ever that States, as Claude Pilloud stated at the 1949 Geneva 
Conference when addressing common Article 1, “should do all in their 
power to see that the basic humanitarian principles of the Conventions . . . 
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